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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Plaintiff Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. ("Lapid"), a real estate 
development firm that unsuccessfully sought approval from 
the Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Township of Scotch 
Plains, New Jersey ("the Board") to build a 95-bed care 
facility for the elderly, appeals the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Board and the Township, 
defendants in Lapid's civil case, challenging their actions 
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under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 
42 U.S.C. S 3601 et seq. Lapid based its claims in the 
District Court primarily on two separate theories under the 
FHAA. First, Lapid contended that Scotch Plains's zoning 
system had a disparate impact on the elderly handicapped 
in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f). Second, Lapid claimed 
that the Board failed to "make reasonable accommodations" 
in order to facilitate housing for the elderly handicapped in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B). 
 
Lapid's primary contentions on appeal are that: (1) 
because the Board failed to engage in the "interactive 
process" that we have held is required of employers by the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. S 701 et seq., and 
because the Board erroneously denied Lapid's request to 
bifurcate its variance and site plan applications, thereby 
depriving it of a full enough record, the District Court erred 
by limiting its review to the administrative record on the 
reasonable accommodations claim; and (2) it was error for 
the District Court to grant summary judgment on both the 
reasonable accommodations and discriminatory impact 
claims. 
 
We resolve the first claim adversely to Lapid by declining 
to extend the "interactive process" requirement that exists 
in the employer-employee context of the Rehabilitation Act 
to the housing and land use context of the FHAA. We 
conclude that the process was never intended to apply in 
this context, and would be especially inappropriate to apply 
to local land use boards, which already face detailed 
procedural requirements under state law. We will also 
affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment on 
both the reasonable accommodations and disparate impact 
claims. Before doing so, we must determine which party 
bears the burden of establishing the various elements of an 
FHAA reasonable accommodations challenge to a local land 
use board's decision. We resolve this question by adopting 
a burden-shifting analysis, in which the plaintiff bears the 
initial burden of showing that its requested 
accommodations are "necessary to afford [handicapped] 
person[s] [an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a 
dwelling," 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B), at which point the 
burden shifts to the defendant to show that the requested 
accommodations are unreasonable. 
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In the present case, we conclude that the plaintiff has 
failed to produce sufficient evidence that the 
accommodations that it requested were "necessary" to 
afford the handicapped an "equal opportunity" to housing, 
and that the Board has shown that the requested 
accommodations were unreasonable, largely because of the 
problems with traffic safety and emergency vehicle access 
that the proposed Facility was likely to cause. We therefore 
affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to 
the defendants on the reasonable accommodations claim. 
We also affirm the District Court's judgment on the 
discriminatory impact claim, because we agree that Lapid 
has failed to establish a prima facie case that Scotch 
Plains's ordinances have a discriminatory impact on the 
elderly handicapped. 
 
I. Facts & Procedural History  
 
On June 9, 1998, Lapid applied to the Zoning Board of 
Adjustment of the Township of Scotch Plains, New Jersey 
for the variances and site plan approval necessary to build 
a long-term care facility for the elderly ("the Facility"). The 
proposed Facility included 35 beds in a skilled nursing 
section, the license for which Lapid wished to transfer from 
its nursing home in nearby Plainfield, New Jersey, and 60 
"assisted living" beds, for which Lapid had originally 
received a license in Westfield, New Jersey. Lapid proposed 
to build the Facility on two contiguous lots, 1290 and 1310 
Martine Avenue. At the time it applied to the Board, Lapid 
owned one of the lots in question and was under contract 
to purchase the other. The lots, which at the time the suit 
began held two single-family houses, would together 
provide 4.17 acres on which Lapid proposed to build a 
58,034 square foot building (with a footprint of 27,640 
square feet). Approximately 45% of the lots, or 1.9 acres, 
was covered by freshwater wetlands and wetland transition 
areas as defined by New Jersey's Freshwater Wetland 
Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 13:9B-1 et seq., and was therefore 
not available for construction. 
 
The Martine Avenue lots are located in an area that is 
zoned R-1 under Scotch Plains's 1976 Master Plan. The R- 
1 zone is designated to permit only single-family houses on 
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large lots (40,000 square feet or more -- about an acre), 
with wide street frontage (a minimum width of 160 feet). 
However, several institutional uses exist in the R-1 zone 
around the lots where Lapid proposed to develop the 
Facility. These include a synagogue, a high school, a YMCA, 
and a country club. 
 
In order to get approval to build the Facility, Lapid 
needed the Board to grant several variances, which it 
applied for on June 9, 1998. Lapid's application requested 
three approvals from the Board. First, because the land use 
that Lapid proposed (i.e., a residential care facility for the 
elderly), did not fit within the uses permitted in an R-1 
zone, Lapid asked for a use variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 
40:55D-70(d). Second, Lapid requested three non-use 
variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c). These sought 
permission to: (1) construct a parking lot in front of the 
building; (2) build a fence in excess of four feet in height; 
and (3) place a freestanding sign in front of the building. All 
of these are prohibited in residential areas and require a 
variance. Third, Lapid sought approval for its site plan. 
 
The Board held four public hearings on Lapid's 
application -- on February 4, March 4, March 15, and 
March 24, 1999. Lapid presented testimony from various 
experts at these meetings, including Julius Szalay, an 
engineer; Stephen Crystal, a gerontologist; Peter Steck, a 
planner; David Horner, a traffic consultant; and Joseph 
Martin, a real estate appraiser. The Board received written 
reports from the Township's experts, Susan Kimball, a 
planner; Paul Ferriero, an engineer; Harold Maltz, a traffic 
consultant; Fire Chief Jonathan Ellis; Police Chief Thomas 
O'Brien; and Sergeant James Rau, the head of the police 
department's traffic safety bureau. Several of these officials 
also testified at the Board's public hearings. 
 
Lapid's engineer made multiple amendments to the site 
plan in order to address the concerns that the Board and 
its experts raised. In particular, these concerns focused on 
the layout of the parking lot and its effect on traffic safety 
both within the Facility's lot and at the point of ingress and 
egress on Martine Avenue, as well as on the access that 
emergency vehicles would have to the rear of the building. 
In order to address the issues of emergency vehicle access, 
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Lapid's planner sought to meet with the Township's fire 
chief beginning on March 10, 1999, but was unable to do 
so until March 22, two days before the Board's final 
meeting at which it considered Lapid's variance and site 
plan applications.1 Lapid did not address the fire chief 's 
latest concerns in a revised site plan prior to the March 24 
meeting, and it requested bifurcation of its applications, 
i.e., it sought a decision on its variance application on 
March 24, but requested the Board's approval for an 
extension on its site plan application. The Board denied 
Lapid's request to bifurcate, and denied the entire 
application on the record before it at the March 24 meeting. 
 
The Board then issued a written denial of Lapid's 
applications. The Board cited the following concerns as its 
reasons for denying the variances and site plan: (1) a 
negative impact on the municipal zoning plan (i.e., siting a 
commercial use in the R-1 zone); (2) traffic safety concerns, 
including increased traffic on Martine Avenue and hazards 
resulting from ingress and egress from the Facility's lot; (3) 
a substantial portion of the site contained wetlands; and (4) 
insufficient access for emergency and fire vehicles. 
 
Lapid then filed a complaint in the District Court against 
the Board, the Township of Scotch Plains (together,"the 
municipal defendants"), Alta Rose, the person from whom 
Lapid had contracted to purchase the property at 1310 
Martine Avenue, and her daughter Barbara Horev, who held 
a durable power of attorney for Rose's benefit. 2 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. When Lapid's representatives finally met with Fire Chief Ellis, he was 
unable to give them specific details regarding the turning radius required 
by the department's largest trucks, in particular, the "tower ladder" 
truck. Ellis had previously raised the concern that the emergency vehicle 
access lane that Lapid proposed could not accommodate the tower 
ladder truck. 
 
2. On March 31, 1999, Rose, through her daughter, Horev, terminated 
her contract with Lapid. On April 29, 1999, Rose filed suit in New Jersey 
Superior Court, Chancery Division, seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the termination was valid. The Superior Court ruled in her favor. Lapid 
appealed this decision, but withdrew its appeal on June 15, 2000, at 
which point the New Jersey Appellate Division entered an order 
dismissing the appeal. The District Court in this case dismissed Lapid's 
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complaint alleged that: (1) the Board's denial of Lapid's 
application for variances and site plan approval violated the 
FHAA's requirement that municipalities "make reasonable 
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, 
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford 
[handicapped] person[s] [an] equal opportunity to use and 
enjoy" housing, 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B); (2) the Township's 
zoning ordinances violated the FHAA, S 3604(f), by having 
an adverse disparate impact on the elderly handicapped; (3) 
the denial violated the New Jersey Constitution and New 
Jersey's Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D- 
1 et seq.; (4) the denial violated the Equal Protection and 
Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, and article I, section I of the New Jersey 
Constitution; and (5) Rose and Horev violated their 
contractual obligations.3 
 
Following discovery, the municipal defendants moved for 
summary judgment, which the District Court granted as to 
all counts. Lapid raises three questions on appeal: (1) 
whether the District Court erred by limiting its review of the 
reasonable accommodations claim to the materials that 
were before the Board (i.e., whether the District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
claims against Rose and Horev as a result of the state court decision, 
and Lapid does not appeal the dismissal. Rose subsequently sold her 
property to the adjacent YMCA, and therefore Lapid seeks only punitive 
and compensatory damages, and declaratory judgment that its rights 
were violated (not an order directing the Board to approve its specific 
site 
plan), because it cannot develop the Facility without the land that Rose 
sold to the YMCA. 
 
3. Plaintiffs may bring three different types of claims against municipal 
land use authorities under the FHAA: (1) intentional discrimination 
claims (also called disparate treatment claims); (2) disparate impact 
claims; and (3) claims that the municipal authority failed to "make 
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, 
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford[handicapped] 
person[s] [an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. 
S 3604(f)(3)(B); see also Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304- 
07 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing the three different causes of action 
available to plaintiffs under the FHAA). In this case, Lapid brings only 
disparate impact and "failure to make reasonable accommodations" 
claims. 
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should have allowed Lapid to supplement the 
administrative record); (2) whether summary judgment was 
proper on the claim that the Board violated the FHAA by 
failing to make reasonable accommodations under 42 
U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B); and (3) whether summary judgment 
was proper on the issue of whether the zoning ordinances 
of Scotch Plains have a disparate impact on the elderly 
handicapped in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f). The District 
Court had jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 42 
U.S.C. S 3613(a); it exercised supplemental jurisdiction over 
the state law claims. This court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We review de novo the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment, see Woodside v. School Dist. of 
Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001), under 
the familiar standard set forth in the margin.4 
 
II. Failure to Make Reasonable Accommodations 
       Under 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B) -- 
       Extent of the Record on Review, and 
       Burdens of Proof 
 
Lapid relies on 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B) for its claim that 
the Board failed to make reasonable accommodations as 
required under that section when it denied Lapid's request 
for variances and site plan approval. The FHAA, 42 U.S.C. 
S 3604(f), requires local land use boards to make 
"reasonable accommodations in rules, policies[and] 
practices" when reviewing proposals for housing for the 
handicapped. It provides in pertinent part that: 
 
        [I]t shall be unlawful -- 
 
       (f) 
 
       (1) To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non- 
moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 
(1986). The judge's function at the summary judgment stage is not to 
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 
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       otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any 
       buyer or renter because of a handicap of -- 
 
        (A) that buyer or renter, 
 
        (B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that 
       dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; 
       or 
 
        (C) any person associated with that buyer or renter. 
 
        . . . . 
 
       (3) For purposes of this subsection, discrimination 
       includes -- 
 
        . . . . 
 
       (B) a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in 
       rules, policies, practices, or services, when such 
       accommodations may be necessary to afford such 
       person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling 
       . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 3604. 
 
Lapid contends that by denying its variance and site plan 
applications, the Board refused to make reasonable 
accommodations to facilitate the construction of housing 
for the elderly handicapped, thereby violating the FHAA. 
Before addressing the question whether summary judgment 
was proper on the reasonable accommodations claim, we 
must first address the proper scope of the record on review 
when hearing a reasonable accommodations challenge to a 
local land use decision brought under the FHAA, and the 
burdens of proof applicable to such a challenge. 
 
A. Was it Error for the District Court to 
       Limit its Review to the Materials That Were 
       Before the Board? 
 
Lapid submits that the District Court erred by limiting its 
review to the materials that were in the administrative 
record before the Board. Lapid asked the District Court for 
permission to supplement the administrative record for the 
purpose of litigating its reasonable accommodations claim, 
but the Court refused, holding that it "must review the 
 
                                9 
  
Zoning Board's decision based solely on the record below." 
Lapid's argument that it was error for the District Court to 
limit its review to the materials that were before the Board 
is grounded on its contentions that the Board and its 
experts failed to engage in an "informal interactive process" 
with Lapid and its engineer, and that it committed 
procedural error by refusing to allow Lapid to bifurcate its 
variance and site plan applications. Lapid contends that 
when a local land use board fails to engage in such a 
process, a court reviewing an FHAA challenge to the local 
board's decision should allow the plaintiff to supplement 
the administrative record. 
 
Lapid points to two sources for the "interactive process" 
requirement that it suggests exists. First, Lapid argues that 
because the reasonable accommodations provision in the 
FHAA is modeled on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. S 701 et seq., a duty of the Board to communicate 
and cooperate in good faith should be imported from this 
court's Rehabilitation Act jurisprudence and grafted onto 
our FHAA jurisprudence. Second, Lapid argues that"New 
Jersey law . . . requires a similar interactive process." In 
view of these contentions, we must address the questions: 
(1) whether the District Court reached the correct legal 
conclusion that courts reviewing FHAA reasonable 
accommodations challenges to zoning board decisions 
should ordinarily limit their review to the record before the 
zoning board; and (2) whether there is an additional 
"interactive process" requirement, which the Board in this 
case failed to meet, that would require a reviewing court to 
look outside the administrative record. 
 
1. Should a Court Reviewing an FHAA Reasonable 
Accommodations Challenge to an Adverse Decision 
from a Local Land Use Board Limit Its Review 
to the Administrative Record? 
 
Although we have not previously addressed the issue of 
the proper scope of review for a federal court reviewing an 
FHAA reasonable accommodations challenge to a decision 
of a local land use board, we are convinced that federal 
courts should limit their review to the materials that were 
presented to the local land use board, except in 
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circumstances where the board prevents applicants from 
presenting sufficient information. 
 
To support its conclusion that a reviewing court should 
not look outside the record when reviewing an FHAA 
reasonable accommodations challenge to a local land use 
decision, the District Court cited Keys Youth Services, Inc. 
v. City of Olathe, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Kan. 1999), 
which was later affirmed in relevant part by the Tenth 
Circuit, 248 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2001). In Keys Youth 
Services, a nonprofit organization (Keys) sought a variance 
that it needed to establish a group home in a single-family 
home in Olathe, Kansas for ten youths who had been 
abused, neglected, or abandoned. After the local land use 
board twice denied Keys's application for a variance, Keys 
sued in federal court, alleging that the board had violated 
the FHAA's reasonable accommodations requirement when 
it refused to grant the variance. The district court granted 
judgment as a matter of law to the City of Olathe on the 
reasonable accommodations claim because it found that 
Keys had failed to present evidence to the local zoning 
board that the requested accommodation was necessary. 
While the court concluded that Keys might have been able 
to show that a minimum of 10 residents was required for 
its group home's financial viability, it found that Keys had 
failed to present any evidence of this necessity to the local 
zoning board. 
 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment 
on the reasonable accommodations claim based "on the 
principle that Olathe cannot be liable for refusing to grant 
a reasonable and necessary accommodation if the City 
never knew the accommodation was in fact necessary." 
Keys Youth Services, 248 F.3d at 1275. The court held that 
plaintiffs should be required to present all of the evidence 
they have that would justify why an accommodation is 
necessary under the FHAA to the local land use board, and 
that a reviewing court should not look outside the 
administrative record. 
 
The Fourth Circuit adopted the same position in Bryant 
Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 
1997), an FHAA reasonable accommodations challenge 
brought by a non-profit group home for adults suffering 
 
                                11 
  
from Alzheimer's Disease that was seeking to expand its 
number of residents from 8 to 15. In Bryant Woods, the 
court refused to look beyond the administrative record and 
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Howard County because the non-profit group had 
failed to present evidence to the local land use board that 
the expansion was "necessary" within the meaning of the 
FHAA. Id. at 605-06. 
 
We join the Tenth and Fourth Circuits in holding that 
courts hearing reasonable accommodations challenges 
should ordinarily limit their review to the administrative 
record. This rule permits local land use boards to have the 
initial opportunity to provide reasonable accommodations 
to facilitate housing for the handicapped; it also comports 
with the tradition in American law that land use decisions 
are quintessentially local in nature. See, e.g. , FERC v. 
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982) ("[R]egulation of 
land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity."); 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that zoning "may indeed 
be the most essential function performed by local 
government"). We too have recognized in similar contexts 
the value of local authorities resolving such matters on 
their own without interference from the federal courts. See 
Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that 
courts should not insert themselves in "delicate area[s]," 
subject to local regulation until local authorities have "had 
the opportunity to apply authoritatively" their specific 
regulations). 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we point out that it may 
be necessary for a court reviewing an FHAA reasonable 
accommodations claim to look outside of the administrative 
record when a land use board either intentionally or 
inadvertently prevents an applicant from presenting the 
evidence necessary to support an FHAA reasonable 
accommodations claim.5 Lapid asserts that the Board's 
 
(Text continued on page 14) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As is clear from the text, our holding that courts reviewing reasonable 
accommodations challenges to local land use decisions brought under 
the FHAA should ordinarily limit their review to the administrative record 
assumes that plaintiffs who bring reasonable accommodations claims 
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against localities must usually first seek redress through variance 
applications to the local land use authority. That holding is therefore in 
tension with some district court decisions from within this Circuit 
(including one that we affirmed summarily) that hold that in some 
circumstances a plaintiff need not first apply for a variance in order to 
bring an FHAA reasonable accommodations claim. See Horizon House 
Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton , 804 F. Supp. 683 
(E.D. Pa. 1992) (allowing a plaintiff to bring an FHAA reasonable 
accommodations challenge to a local zoning ordinance without first 
seeking a variance from a local land use board), judgment aff 'd without 
op., 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993); Assisted Living Assocs. of Moorestown, 
L.L.C. v. Moorestown Township, 996 F. Supp. 409, 425-28 (D.N.J. 1998) 
(same). But see Marriott Senior Living Servs., Inc. v. Springfield 
Township, 
78 F. Supp. 2d 376, 385-86 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("While strict compliance 
with every local ordinance or regulation is not required . . . the 
applicant 
must show that under the circumstances it has afforded the appropriate 
local authority a reasonable opportunity to consider the project in some 
final form."); Community Interactions -- Bucks County, Inc. v. Township 
of Bensalem, 1994 WL 702943, 8 A.D.D. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (dismissing 
an FHAA suit because the plaintiff failed to seek a variance with the 
local 
land use board). In the cases where district courts heard FHAA claims 
without requiring the plaintiff to have first sought a variance with a 
local 
land use authority, the reviewing court necessarily had to consider 
materials from outside the nonexistent administrative record. 
 
Although we are not bound by the district court cases cited above, 
including the case that we summarily affirmed, (summary affirmances 
are non-precedential, see 3d Cir. I.O.P. 6.2.1), and we are not presented 
with and do not reach questions of ripeness or exhaustion in this case, 
we note that the position adopted by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits on 
when plaintiffs bringing FHAA reasonable accommodations challenges 
against localities must first apply for variances with local land use 
boards rationalizes these cases (which allowed plaintiffs to bring 
reasonable accommodations claims without first seeking a variance) with 
the necessary implication of our holding today (that most reasonable 
accommodations claims must first be presented to local land use 
boards). In United States v. Village of Palatine , 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 
1994), the Seventh Circuit reviewed an FHAA reasonable 
accommodations challenge to a local ordinance for which the plaintiff 
had not sought a variance. The court held that the claim was not ripe, 
and that in general a city must be afforded the opportunity to make the 
requested accommodation. Id. at 1233. However, the court identified two 
exceptions where the claim would be ripe even if the plaintiff had not 
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denial of its request to bifurcate its variance and site plan 
applications was unreasonable and in violation of New 
Jersey's Municipal Land Use Law, and prevented it from 
presenting materials relevant to its reasonable 
accommodations claim. In particular, Lapid argues that it 
had a statutory right to bifurcate its applications at any 
point during the application review procedure pursuant to 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-76(b), which provides that "[t]he developer 
may elect to submit a separate application requesting 
approval of the variance and a subsequent application for 
any required approval of a subdivision, site plan or 
conditional use." Therefore, contends Lapid, the District 
Court should have granted Lapid's request to supplement 
the administrative record. 
 
The Board responds that its denial of Lapid's variance 
and site plan applications at the March 24 meeting was 
merely the result of Lapid's refusal to consent to an 
extension on both applications, which it had the power to 
do pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-76(c). The Board further 
submits that even if it had granted the request to bifurcate, 
it could not have meaningfully evaluated Lapid's variance 
application without reference to the specific problems that 
the Board had identified with the site plan application. In 
other words, the Board argues that Lapid essentially forced 
it to review its site plan application as it existed at the 
March 24 meeting by not consenting to an extension on 
both the variance and site plan applications. Therefore, the 
argument continues, Lapid cannot now complain that the 
Board prevented it from presenting all of the information 
necessary to support its reasonable accommodations claim. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
first sought a variance from the local land use board: (1) if the claim 
were a challenge to the variance application procedure itself; and (2) if 
the variance application process was demonstrably futile. Id. at 1234. 
The Village of Palatine court also limited the ripeness rule that it 
formed 
to reasonable accommodations claims and noted that"if the plaintiff 's 
claim were of discriminatory intent, rather than failure to make a 
reasonable accommodation, th[e] claim might well be presently ripe even 
though [the plaintiff] has not sought a special use approval." Id. at 1233 
n.3. The Eighth Circuit has followed the Seventh Circuit's ripeness rule 
for FHAA reasonable accommodations claims. See Oxford House-A v. City 
of Univ. City, 87 F.3d 1022, 1024-25 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 
                                14 
  
New Jersey's Municipal Land Use Law provides that local 
zoning boards must act on an application for a variance or 
site plan approval within 120 days of when a complete 
application is submitted. If a zoning board fails to act 
within the statutory period, the application is deemed 
granted by force of law. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73(b). 
However, an applicant may consent to the extension of this 
120-day period. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73(b); N.J.S.A. 
40:55D-76(c). In the present case, Lapid's counsel agreed to 
extend the Board's deadline once to April 1, 1999. Instead 
of offering to extend the deadline again, Lapid sought to 
bifurcate its applications and to require the Board to vote 
on the variance application before April 1 or to have it 
approved by force of law. 
 
Lapid contends that by requesting to bifurcate its 
application, it was offering to extend the time limit for the 
site plan application, and resting its case only on the 
variance application. Because of New Jersey's statutory 
scheme governing the evaluation of variance applications, 
however, we agree that the Board could not have 
meaningfully considered the variance application without 
reference to the specific problems that it had identified in 
the site plan application and Lapid's proposed solutions to 
these problems, and that the offer to extend time for 
consideration of the site plan application was therefore 
essentially meaningless. 
 
The section of the MLUL that governs applications for use 
variances, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d), requires an applicant to 
establish that certain positive and negative criteria are 
fulfilled in order to have the variance granted. See Smart 
SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 
704 A.2d 1271, 1278 (N.J. 1998). To establish the positive 
criteria, the applicant generally must show " `special 
reasons' for the grant of the variance." Sica v. Bd. of 
Adjustment of the Township of Wall, 603 A.2d 30, 32 (N.J. 
1992). The "negative criteria require proof that the variance 
`can be granted without substantial detriment to the public 
good' and that it will not substantially impair the intent 
and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance." Id. 
(quoting N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)). When the variance 
application seeks permission for an "inherently beneficial 
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use," as it does in this case, the application presumptively 
satisfies the positive criteria. See Smart SMR , 704 A.2d at 
1278. The New Jersey Supreme Court has instructed that 
when evaluating a variance application for an inherently 
beneficial use, a zoning board must identify and"weigh the 
positive and negative criteria and determine whether, on 
balance, the grant of the variance would cause a 
substantial detriment to the public good." Id. at 1279 
(quoting Sica, 603 A.2d at 37). 
 
The potential negative criteria relating to the use variance 
that Lapid sought in this case are directly related to its 
proposed site plan. In denying the application, the Board 
relied on concerns about traffic safety and emergency 
vehicle access. These issues certainly go to the question 
whether the variance would cause "substantial detriment to 
the public good." N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d). Further, the size of 
the proposed Facility, another expressed concern, goes to 
the question whether granting the variance would 
"substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone 
plan and zoning ordinance." N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d). 
Therefore, even assuming that it was error to deny the 
bifurcation, we do not see how the Board could have 
considered the negative statutory criteria that it was 
required to consider without reference to the site plan 
application as it existed when the Board denied the  
application.6 Lapid argues that a zoning board can consider 
a variance application with stipulated or hypothetical 
conditions on a site plan that will be considered 
subsequent to the approval of the variance application. To 
be sure, this may be feasible and desirable in some cases. 
We do not see, however, how it would have been feasible in 
the present case. 
 
Most importantly, we agree with the District Court that 
"based on a reading of the Zoning Board's hearing on the 
matter, it appears that Lapid-Laurel was given a full and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We do not address the question whether the Board committed 
procedural error under the MLUL that would require its decision to be 
reversed. That would be an issue appropriate for direct appeal to the 
New Jersey courts, and, at all events, Lapid did not present it to the 
District Court or this court. 
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fair opportunity to present its case before the Zoning Board. 
Over the course of four hearings, Lapid . . . presented five 
witnesses and various exhibits." Indeed, as the District 
Court noted, "[p]laintiff 's counsel even conceded at oral 
argument that the Board in no way prevented plaintiff from 
presenting any and all evidence it wished to advance." 
Therefore, we do not think that the Board's denial of 
Lapid's request to bifurcate its applications shows that the 
Board prevented Lapid from presenting the necessary 
evidence to support its FHAA claim, nor does it provide a 
sufficient reason for this court to look outside the 
administrative record when reviewing Lapid's reasonable 
accommodations claim. 
 
2. Does the FHAA or New Jersey Law Require a 
       Local Land Use Board to Engage in an "Informal 
       Interactive Process" with a Developer?  
 
Lapid argues that the FHAA itself, or alternatively New 
Jersey's MLUL, imposes an affirmative obligation on local 
land use boards to engage in an "informal interactive 
process" with variance applicants. Lapid argues that the 
Board in this case failed to engage in that process (citing in 
particular the inability of Lapid's representatives to meet 
with Fire Chief Ellis when they wanted to do so), and that 
therefore it is appropriate for a reviewing federal court to 
look at materials from outside the administrative record. 
For the following reasons, we do not think that any such 
"informal interactive process" requirement exists. 
 
Lapid argues that because the language of the FHAA's 
reasonable accommodations requirement was borrowed 
from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. S 701 et seq., 
and that because this court has held that under the 
Rehabilitation Act, a defendant employer has "a duty to 
make reasonable efforts to assist [an employee,] to 
communicate with him in good faith," Mengine v. Runyon, 
114 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1997), a local land use board 
has a similar duty under the FHAA to engage in an 
"informal interactive process" with a developer seeking a 
variance on behalf of the handicapped. 
 
Mengine involved a Rehabilitation Act challenge brought 
by a Postal Service employee, alleging that the Service had 
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failed to provide reasonable accommodations by failing to 
move him to a position other than letter carrier after he 
became disabled and incapable of fulfilling the duties of 
that position. Relying on Beck v. University of Wisconsin, 75 
F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996), an analogous case from the 
Seventh Circuit that involved a claim brought under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Mengine  held that 
"both parties [i.e., the employer and the employee] have a 
duty to assist in the search for [an] appropriate reasonable 
accommodation." 114 F.3d at 420. 
 
Beck involved a similar claim brought by a disabled 
employee under the ADA against her employer for failing to 
provide reasonable accommodations for her disability. In 
Beck, the court specifically relied on 29 C.F.R.S 1630 
(1995), a regulation promulgated pursuant to the ADA, to 
reach its conclusion that "[t]he appropriate accommodation" 
for an employer to provide "is best determined through a 
flexible, interactive process that involves both the employer 
and the [employee] with a disability." Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135 
(quoting 29 C.F.R. S 1630, app. (1995)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Although we recognized in Mengine that 29 
C.F.R. S 1630 technically applies only to the ADA, we found 
that Beck was "relevant to our analysis of the Rehabilitation 
Act because in 1992 the Rehabilitation Act was amended 
to incorporate the standards of several sections of 
the ADA, including the section defining `reasonable 
accommodation.' " Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420. We have 
elaborated on the interactive process in later cases. See 
Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 234 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 
The FHAA borrows language from the Rehabilitation Act. 
See Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1101 
(3d Cir. 1996). However, the FHAA and the Rehabilitation 
Act do not bear the significant similarities that justified 
importing the requirements of 29 C.F.R. S 1630 from the 
ADA to the Rehabilitation Act. The informal interactive 
process that S 1630 describes applies specifically to an 
employer-employee relationship. The regulation was 
promulgated to apply in the employment context, and it is 
highly doubtful that it was ever contemplated that it would 
apply in the very different context of housing and land use 
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regulations. Moreover, we believe that it would be 
particularly inappropriate to impose it on local land use 
boards because they already face detailed state and 
municipal requirements mandating formal procedures, 
which, at least in some cases, prohibit them from engaging 
in informal, off-the-record negotiations with variance 
applicants. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10 (requiring that local 
zoning boards hold hearings for variance applications at 
which testimony is given under oath and produce written 
resolutions that contain findings of fact and legal 
conclusions based on these hearings); see also Commons v. 
Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 A.2d 1138, 1145 
(N.J. 1980) (noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
"ha[s] frequently advised boards of adjustment to make 
findings predicated upon factual support in the record").7 
Therefore, we hold that notwithstanding the "interactive 
process" requirement that exists in the law of this court in 
the employment context under the Rehabilitation Act, see 
Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420, the FHAA imposes no such 
requirement on local land use authorities. 
 
Lapid also argues that New Jersey law requires local 
zoning boards to engage in an informal interactive process 
with developers who apply for site plan approvals. To 
support this proposition, Lapid cites the following language 
from Pizzo Mantin Group v. Township of Randolph , 645 A.2d 
89 (N.J. 1994): 
 
       Although a planning board is not required affirmatively 
       to propose suggested revisions and modifications of a 
       subdivision plan or site plan, the MLUL [Municipal 
       Land Use Law] contemplates active involvement by 
       planning boards in their review of subdivisions. The 
       generalized design standards for subdivision 
       ordinances prescribed by the MLUL necessarily invoke 
       the planning board's expertise and familiarity with 
       local conditions and implicate the exercise of discretion 
       by planning boards. . . . That discretion is best 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. By imposing an "informal interactive process" on land use boards, we 
would also be compromising the important policies underlying state law 
limitations on off-the-record contacts between developers and board 
members, such as limiting the potential for corruption of local officials. 
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       exercised by a process in which planning boards 
       affirmatively interact with developers when reviewing 
       proposed subdivisions. 
 
Id. at 98 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). We do not 
agree that Pizzo Mantin imposes a requirement that local 
land use boards engage in an informal interactive process 
with developers. First, the language in the case says that 
how a board interacts with a developer is a matter of 
discretion that is "best exercised" when "planning boards 
affirmatively interact with developers." Id. at 233. This 
language is far from mandatory. Second, it is unclear how, 
if the Scotch Plains zoning board violated New Jersey's 
MLUL in this case, that should bear on the scope of review 
of a federal FHAA claim (unless in violating the MLUL, the 
Board prevented Lapid from presenting necessary evidence). 
To the extent that Lapid is attempting to argue its pendent 
state law claims, it is barred from doing so because it failed 
to raise these state law claims in this appeal. 
 
It is generally beneficial for land use boards to be 
cooperative with developers, and we do not think that the 
Board engaged in model behavior toward Lapid in this case. 
Nevertheless, we cannot impose an interactive process 
requirement on the Board as a matter of law. 
 
B. Burdens of Proof for Reasonable 
Accommodations Claims 
 
As noted above, Lapid relies on 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B) 
for its claim that the Board failed to make reasonable 
accommodations as required under that section when it 
denied Lapid's request for variances and site plan approval. 
The statute provides that it is unlawful "[t]o discriminate 
against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services 
or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a 
handicap . . . ." 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(2). The statute defines 
discrimination to include "a refusal to make reasonable 
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, 
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford 
such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a 
dwelling." S 3604(f)(3)(B). 
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Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 
1996), is the only case in which we have addressed the 
legal framework of an FHAA reasonable accommodations 
claim. Hovsons focused mainly on the meaning of the 
"reasonable accommodations" part of S 3604(f)(3)(B), as 
opposed to the meaning and import of the terms 
"necessary" and "equal opportunity." The main question in 
Hovsons was which party carried the burden on the 
reasonableness issue, i.e., whether it is the plaintiff 's 
burden to show that the requested accommodation is 
reasonable, or the defendant's burden to show that it is 
not. Hovsons relied on our Rehabilitation Act cases to hold 
that it is the defendant's burden to show that the requested 
accommodation is unreasonable: 
 
       Our precedents interpreting S 504 of the Rehabilitation 
       Act have held that the burden of proving that a 
       proposed accommodation is not reasonable rests with 
       the defendant. See Juvelis v. Snider, 68 F.3d 648, 653 
       & n.5 (3d Cir. 1995); Nathanson v. Medical College of 
       Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991). As 
       we have already held that courts must look to the body 
       of law developed under S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
       as an interpretive guide to the `reasonable 
       accommodations' provisions of the FHAA, we further 
       hold that the burden should have been placed on the 
       [defendant] [t]ownship . . . to prove that it was either 
       unable to accommodate [the plaintiff] or that the 
       accommodation . . . proposed was unreasonable. 
 
Hovsons, 89 F.3d at 1103. At least three Courts of Appeals 
disagree with our position on which party has the burden 
on the issue of reasonableness. See Groner v. Golden Gate 
Garden Apartments, 250 F.3d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 2001) 
("[W]e conclude that the plaintiff in a Fair Housing Act case 
has the burden of proof to establish the reasonableness of 
a proposed accommodation."); Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. 
Howard County, 124 F.3d 597, 603-04 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that it is the plaintiff 's burden to show that the 
requested accommodation is reasonable); Elderhaven, Inc. 
v. City of Lubbock, 98 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e 
reject the suggestion of certain courts that a Fair Housing 
Act defendant bears the burden of proof on the question of 
reasonableness.") (citing Hovsons). 
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Although Hovsons discussed only the "reasonableness" 
part of the statute, the Township contends that the 
plaintiffs were also required to show that the requested 
accommodations were "necessary to afford . . .[an] equal 
opportunity" to the handicapped. 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B). 
We agree that the plain language of the statute requires us 
to focus on all three factors, i.e., whether the requested 
accommodation is "(1) reasonable and (2) necessary to (3) 
afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use 
and enjoy housing." Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 603. 
Therefore, we must determine which party carries the 
burden of demonstrating these issues. We are bound by 
Hovsons's holding that the defendant bears the burden of 
showing that the accommodation is unreasonable, but 
because Hovsons did not decide which party has the 
burden of showing that the requested accommodation is 
necessary to afford handicapped persons an equal 
opportunity to housing, we must decide these issues. We 
think that under S 3604(f)(3)(B) the plaintiff bears the initial 
burden of showing that the requested accommodation is 
necessary to afford handicapped persons an equal 
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, at which point the 
burden shifts to the defendant to show that the requested 
accommodation is unreasonable. 
 
We believe that this approach makes more sense and 
more closely comports with the likely intent of Congress 
than the approach of placing the burden on the defendant 
to show both (1) that the requested accommodation is not 
necessary to create an equal opportunity for housing; and 
(2) that it is unreasonable. We initially note that the 
Rehabilitation Act cases on which Hovsons relied provide 
no guidance on the issue of who should bear the burden on 
factors other than reasonableness. In fact, they provide 
little analysis even on the issue of who should bear the 
burden on reasonableness. See Juvelis v. Snider , 68 F.3d 
648, 653 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating without discussion that 
"the burden is on [the defendant] to demonstrate that 
adjusting its requirements would fundamentally alter the 
program or impose an undue burden on the department"); 
Nathanson v. Med. College of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1385 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (same). But see McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. 
of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 859 n.11 (5th Cir. 1993) 
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(holding that S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act imposes the 
burden of proof as to reasonableness on the plaintiff). 
 
Because the cases on which Hovsons relied to place the 
burden on the reasonableness issue on the defendant do 
not provide any guidance as to where the burden should be 
placed on the other issues (that would be analogous to the 
"necessary" and "equal opportunity" elements of 
S 3604(f)(3)), and because "the FHA[A]'s text evidences no 
intent to alter normal burdens" from the plaintiff to the 
defendant, Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 603-04, we must 
determine whether Congress intended to place the burden 
on the issue of whether the requested accommodation is 
"necessary to create an equal opportunity" on the plaintiff 
or the defendant. We think that a burden-shifting approach 
in which the plaintiff would first have the burden of 
demonstrating that the requested accommodation is 
necessary to create an equal opportunity, at which point 
the burden would shift to the defendant to show that the 
accommodation is unreasonable, makes sense from a policy 
standpoint. 
 
While a plaintiff is in the best position to show what is 
necessary to afford its clients (i.e., the handicapped 
population that it wishes to serve) an equal opportunity to 
use and enjoy housing, a defendant municipality is in the 
best position to provide evidence concerning what is 
reasonable or unreasonable within the context of its zoning 
scheme. This burden-shifting approach is also consistent 
with the approach that courts have applied to intentional 
discrimination and disparate impact claims brought under 
42 U.S.C. S 3604(f), the two other types of FHAA claims 
available against local land use boards in addition to 
reasonable accommodations claims. See 148 A.L.R. Fed. 1, 
53, S 3[e] (1998) ("The courts tend to follow a burden- 
shifting approach in determining whether a defendant's 
conduct is violative of 42 U.S.C.A. S 3604(f).. . . [O]nce the 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of housing 
discrimination under the statute, . . . the burden shifts to 
the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct or, in the case of 
a governmental defendant, to show that its actions 
furthered a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest, and 
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that no alternative would serve that interest with less 
discriminatory effect. Once the defendant has made such a 
showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that 
the reason asserted by the defendant is merely a pretext for 
discrimination."); see also Stephenson v. Ridgewood Village 
Apartments, 1994 WL 792581, 8 A.D.D. 414 (W.D. Mich. 
1994) (applying a 3-step burden-shifting analysis to claims 
of intentional discrimination brought under 42 U.S.C. 
S 3604). Because it makes sense from a policy standpoint 
and is consistent with courts' interpretation of other claims 
brought under the FHAA, we conclude that Congress 
intended to place on the plaintiff the burden of showing 
that a requested accommodation is "necessary" to give the 
handicapped an "equal opportunity" to use and enjoy 
housing. 
 
In sum, we read S 3604(f)(3) to require a burden-shifting 
analysis in which the initial burden is on the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the accommodations that it requested are 
"necessary to afford [handicapped] persons[an] equal 
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling," 42 U.S.C. 
S 3604(f)(3)(B), at which point the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show that the requested accommodations are 
unreasonable. 
 
III. Was Summary Judgment Proper on the 
Reasonable Accommodations Claim?  
 
In order to evaluate the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment to the municipal defendants on the 
reasonable accommodations claim, we must determine 
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding: 
(1) whether the accommodations that Lapid requested were 
necessary to afford handicapped persons an equal 
opportunity to use and enjoy housing; and, if so (2) whether 
the accommodations requested were unreasonable. 
 
As an initial matter, there are two points on which the 
parties agree or that are settled beyond dispute with 
respect to the reasonable accommodations claim: (1) that 
the future residents of the Facility that Lapid proposed to 
build would be handicapped within the meaning of Section 
3604(f), see Hovsons, 89 F.3d at 1103 n.3; and (2) that a 
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nursing home like the one that Lapid proposed qualifies as 
a "dwelling" within the meaning of the statute, see id. at 
1102. 
 
A. Did Lapid Demonstrate That the Accommodations 
       it Requested Were Necessary to Afford Elderly 
       Handicapped Persons an Equal Opportunity to Use 
       and Enjoy Housing? 
 
As noted above, we have not previously addressed the 
"necessity" and "equal opportunity" factors of a 
S 3604(f)(3)(B) claim. The Courts of Appeals that have 
provided the most discussion of the meaning of these terms 
in the FHAA are the Sixth and Fourth Circuits. The key to 
their analysis is that the plaintiff in an FHAA reasonable 
accommodations case must establish a nexus between the 
accommodations that he or she is requesting, and their 
necessity for providing handicapped individuals an"equal 
opportunity" to use and enjoy housing. 
 
In Smith & Lee Associates, Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 
781 (6th Cir. 1996), an FHAA challenge by a residential 
facility for Alzheimer's patients to the city's denial of its 
application to expand its facility from 6 to 12 patients, the 
Sixth Circuit discussed the meaning of "necessity" and 
"equal opportunity" in S 3604(f)(3)(B). Turning first to the 
meaning of "equal opportunity," the court cited the House 
Report on the Act, which states that the FHAA was 
designed to " `end the unnecessary exclusion of persons 
with handicaps from the American mainstream.' " 102 F.3d 
at 794 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 
18, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179). From this, 
the court concluded that the FHAA defines "equal 
opportunity . . . [to] giv[e] handicapped individuals the right 
to choose to live in single-family neighborhoods, for that 
right serves to end the exclusion of handicapped 
individuals from the American mainstream." Id . at 794-95; 
see also Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 911 F. 
Supp. 918, 946 (D. Md. 1996) ("[T]he Act prohibits local 
governments from applying land use regulations in a 
manner that will exclude people with disabilities entirely 
from zoning neighborhoods, particularly residential 
neighborhoods, or that will give disabled people less 
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opportunity to live in certain neighborhoods than people 
without disabilities."), aff 'd 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 
Next turning to the meaning of "necessary," the Smith & 
Lee court concluded that in order to show that a requested 
accommodation is "necessary" plaintiffs "must show that, 
but for the accommodation, they likely will be denied an 
equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice." 102 
F.3d at 795. The Fourth Circuit also defined the word 
"necessary" to require a link between the proposed 
accommodation and the "equal opportunity" in question: 
 
       The "necessary" element . . . requires the 
       demonstration of a direct linkage between the proposed 
       accommodation and the "equal opportunity" to be 
       provided to the handicapped person. This requirement 
       has attributes of a causation requirement. And if the 
       proposed accommodation provides no direct 
       amelioration of a disability's effect, it cannot be said to 
       be "necessary." 
 
Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 604. 
 
Other courts have also recognized that the equal 
opportunity to live in a residential zone is valid under 
S 3604(f)(3)(B). See, e.g., Smith & Lee Assocs., 102 F.3d at 
795 ("[E]lderly disabled citizens have a right to live in [a 
town's] single-family neighborhoods."). We agree. The "equal 
opportunity" that Lapid seeks to provide here is the 
opportunity for handicapped persons to live in a single- 
family residential neighborhood. Most of the 
accommodations that Lapid sought are geared toward 
getting exceptions from the stringent zoning requirements 
of Scotch Plains's R-1 zone. 
 
With respect to the use variance, it is clear that Lapid 
demonstrated that a use variance was necessary to achieve 
an equal opportunity for the elderly handicapped to live in 
a residential area of Scotch Plains. This is true almost by 
definition. The elderly handicapped who need skilled 
nursing care usually are not able to live in their own 
houses. They must live in some sort of institutional setting 
in order to receive the assistance or health care that they 
need. No institutional health care facilities are permitted 
without a use variance in the neighborhoods zoned R-1 
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residential in Scotch Plains. Therefore, a use variance is 
necessary for the elderly handicapped to have an equal 
opportunity to live in a residential area of Scotch Plains. 
Lapid's experts were explicit that one of the objectives of the 
proposed Facility was to allow the elderly to live in a 
predominately single-family residential zone. Dr. Stephen 
Crystal, Lapid's gerontologist, expert gave the following 
answer to a question that Lapid's lawyer asked him at one 
of the Board's public hearings: 
 
       Atty. Butler: ". . . Dr. Crystal, generally in your 
       professional opinion, is it appropriate to site an 
       assisted living nursing home in a residential zone?" 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Dr. Crystal: "There has been a lot of emphasis on long- 
       term care, in trying to normalize long-term care,[and] 
       bring[ing] people as much as possible into settings 
       where they feel they are part of the mainstream and 
       they feel they are not segregated. And I believe that's a 
       benefit." 
 
While we think it clear that the use variance that Lapid 
requested was necessary to provide the elderly handicapped 
an equal opportunity to live in a residential neighborhood, 
it is a much closer question whether Lapid established that 
the particular features of the site plan that it requested 
were necessary to provide the elderly handicapped an equal 
opportunity to live in a residential area of Scotch Plains. All 
of the Board's site-plan-specific objections really seem to 
boil down to the objection that the Facility (both the 
building and the number of residents it would house) would 
be too large for the site on which it was proposed and for 
the surrounding neighborhood. A strict interpretation of the 
"necessity" requirements of S 3604(f)(3)(B) would require 
Lapid to show that a building of the size that it proposed is 
required to provide the handicapped an equal opportunity 
to live in a residential neighborhood. 
 
Courts that have taken this approach have required a 
plaintiff to show that the size of the proposed facility either 
would be necessary for the facility's financial viability (and 
therefore necessary to give the handicapped an equal 
opportunity to live in a residential neighborhood) or would 
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serve a therapeutic purpose, (and would therefore be 
necessary to ameliorate an effect of the handicap). See 
Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 605 (concluding that the 
plaintiff had failed to demonstrate why expanding its group 
home was necessary other than it would increase its 
profits, even though it was already making a sustaining 
profit); Smith & Lee Assocs., 102 F.3d at 788 (holding that 
the test to determine whether expansion of a group home 
was financially necessary was not whether "a particular 
profit-making company needs such an accommodation, 
but, rather do businesses as a whole need this 
accommodation") (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Brandt v. Village of Chebanse , 82 F.3d 
172, 174 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that "some minimum size 
may be essential to the success" of group care facilities). We 
agree that the FHAA requires Lapid to show that the size of 
its proposed Facility is required to make it financially viable 
or medically effective. 
 
Lapid presented some evidence on the therapeutic value 
served by the scale of its group home. Dr. Crystal, the 
gerontologist, testified that assisted living facilities above a 
certain size were less desirable from a therapeutic 
standpoint, and opined that he had observed that care 
facilities that contained between 80 and 100 beds"seem to 
work very well." Dr. Crystal did not testify, however, that 
care facilities for the elderly that are smaller than the 
proposed facility are unable to provide the range of care 
required or that it would be economically infeasible to 
operate a smaller facility. We therefore do not think that on 
the basis of Dr. Crystal's testimony regarding the 
therapeutic effectiveness of facilities of the size that Lapid 
was proposing, a reasonable jury could find that Lapid had 
shown that the specific features of its proposed facility (its 
size in particular) were "necessary to afford[handicapped] 
. . . person[s] [an] equal opportunity" to live in a residential 
neighborhood in Scotch Plains. 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B).8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Lapid also asserts that it has necessarily shown that its requested 
accommodations were necessary because it was issued a Certificate of 
Need ("C.O.N.," i.e., a license), by the New Jersey Department of Health 
and Senior Services. Developers of healthcare facilities such as the one 
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But even if Lapid had presented sufficient evidence to 
create a triable issue of fact on whether the proposed 
facility was "necessary to afford [handicapped] . . . person[s] 
[an] equal opportunity" to live in a residential neighborhood 
in Scotch Plains, S 3604(f)(3)(B), the municipal defendants 
would be entitled to summary judgment on the alternative 
ground that the requested accommodations were 
unreasonable, which we explain below. 
 
B. Did the Board Demonstrate That the Requested 
Accommodations Were Unreasonable? 
 
In Hovsons, we established the legal framework for 
determining whether a requested accommodation is 
"reasonable" under 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B). We held that 
in order to "establish that the accommodation proffered by 
[the applicant] was not reasonable, [the municipality] [i]s 
required to prove that it could not have granted the 
variance without:" (1) "imposing undue financial and 
administrative burdens;" (2) "imposing an`undue hardship' 
upon the Township;" or (3) "requiring a fundamental 
alteration in the nature of the [zoning] program." Hovsons, 
89 F.3d at 1104 (internal citations and quotation marks 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that Lapid proposed are required to apply for Certificates of Need 
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:2H-7. The municipal defendants argue that the 
C.O.N. is irrelevant to whether the proposed Facility is necessary under 
the FHAA because (1) the issuance of a C.O.N. by the DHSS "expresses 
no specific determination by the Department of Health of the need for 
any particular proposed facility"; and (2) the particular C.O.N. that 
Lapid 
was issued was initially designated for a facility in Westfield, New 
Jersey, 
and therefore has no bearing on a determination of Scotch Plains's need 
for a nursing home. 
 
We agree with the Township that the State's issuance of the C.O.N. to 
Lapid is not material to the question whether the Facility that it 
proposed is "necessary" to provide an "equal opportunity" for the elderly 
handicapped to use housing in Scotch Plains. Even assuming that Lapid 
is correct that the DHSS certificate represents the State of New Jersey's 
conclusion that Union County is in need of additional assisted living and 
skilled nursing facilities, that alone does not establish a nexus between 
the requested accommodations, and their necessity to create an equal 
opportunity for the handicapped. 
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omitted). We cautioned that this inquiry is "highly fact- 
specific, requiring a case-by-case determination." Id. 
(quoting United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 
29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1994)). We also noted that 
"[w]e must review the reasonable accommodations 
requirement `in light of two countervailing legislative 
concerns: (1) effectuation of the statute's objectives of 
assisting the handicapped; and (2) the need to impose 
reasonable boundaries in accomplishing this purpose.' " Id. 
(quoting Americans Disabled For Accessible Pub. Transp. 
(ADAPT) v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1191 (3d Cir. 1989) (en 
banc)). Thus, the question we face is whether, taking the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Lapid, there remains 
a genuine dispute as to whether there was sufficient 
evidence before the Board that Lapid's requested 
accommodations (i.e., the variance and site plan 
applications for the proposed Facility) were unreasonable. 
 
The municipal defendants in this case argue that certain 
features of Lapid's proposed Facility that resulted from its 
excessive size and the fact that approximately two acres at 
the back of the lot (the whole lot was 4.17 acres) were 
unusable because they were covered with protected 
wetlands shows that the plan would have imposed an 
"undue hardship" on the Township, and that it would have 
"required a fundamental alteration" in the nature of the 
Township's zoning program. Hovsons, 89 F.3d at 1104. The 
municipal defendants point to two categories of objections 
to the site plan that they identified during the hearing 
process as evidence that the accommodations that Lapid 
requested (in the form of the site plan and non-use 
variances) were unreasonable (i.e., that they would have 
imposed an "undue hardship upon the Township," or that 
they would have required the Township to "fundamentally 
alter" its zoning program, see Hovsons, 89 F.3d at 1104). 
 
The two main categories that the Board identified are (1) 
traffic safety issues (including traffic movement within the 
parking lot, increased traffic on Martine Avenue, and safety 
of ingress and egress from the parking lot); and (2) 
inadequate access for emergency vehicles. We think that 
the Board raised serious and legitimate concerns about 
these issues and that Lapid failed to rebut these concerns 
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or to account for them by altering its proposed plan, and 
that therefore summary judgment for the defendants was 
proper on the reasonable accommodations claim. To help 
describe these concerns, we set forth the proposed site plan 
that Lapid presented to the Board at the March 24 meeting. 
 
(see next page) 
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1. Traffic Safety Concerns 
 
The municipal defendants flag several different concerns 
regarding traffic safety issues that they say show that the 
site plan that Lapid proposed was unreasonable. Several of 
the criticisms that the Board's experts presented on the 
traffic safety issues center on potential hazards at the point 
of ingress and egress from the Facility's proposed parking 
lot, particularly the fact that the entrance to the parking lot 
requires a 180 degree turn for cars turning right and a 
sharp turn across oncoming cars for cars turning left. Both 
Harold Maltz, the Board's traffic consultant, and Paul 
Ferriero, the Board's engineer, opined that the turns into 
the parking lot were too sharp and would force cars to 
make multiple-point "K turns" that would disrupt the flow 
of traffic into and out of the Facility's parking lot and would 
increase the likelihood of an accident. 
 
Maltz stated that "a vehicle coming south on Martine 
[Avenue] making a right, [would] essentially [be required to 
make] a hundred and eighty degree turn to turn into the 
site, . . . [and the vehicle would have] to be able to make 
another hundred and eighty degree turn to drop off a 
passenger at the main entrance." Ferriero commented that 
in order to make the two sharp turns that a car must make 
in order to reach the passenger drop off area, a driver 
would have to be "very familiar with the site or have 
planned in advance." Similarly, Maltz predicted in his 
written report that a car attempting to make a right turn 
after entering the parking lot would tend to stray into the 
lane of oncoming traffic (due to the tight 180 degree turn 
that is required), thereby increasing the likelihood of an 
accident. 
 
The Board's experts also predicted that the defects in the 
point of ingress/egress would increase the risk of an 
accident happening on Martine Avenue. Sergeant James 
Rau, the police department's director of traffic safety, 
predicted that the difficult turn-in site and its closeness to 
the intersection of Martine Avenue and West Broad Street 
would cause cars turning into the Facility to pause for 
longer than normal. He concluded that this would increase 
the likelihood of accidents. Rau also stated in his report 
that drivers seeking to go south on Martine Avenue through 
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a green light at the intersection of Martine and West Broad 
could be forced into the right lane (to go around cars 
waiting to turn left) and would be forced immediately to 
switch back into the right lane (to avoid cars turning in to 
the Facility's parking lot). This, he concluded, would also 
increase the likelihood of accidents. 
 
Lapid's engineer agreed at the March 4 meeting that 
redesigning the area of ingress/egress was a "good 
suggestion," but failed to submit a redesigned plan dealing 
with the traffic safety criticisms regarding ingress/egress. 
Lapid also did not point to any information in the record 
that contradicts the Board's experts' opinions that the 
design of the entrance to the Facility's parking lot posed 
traffic safety hazards. 
 
The Board's experts also raised concerns about internal 
traffic safety, i.e., within the Facility's parking lot, especially 
with respect to delivery trucks that would be forced to go 
around to the loading dock at the south side of the building 
and would then be unlikely to be able to turn around 
without backing up a long distance. Both Ferriero and 
Maltz testified that the parking lot's layout would require 
delivery trucks to back a long way out of the driveway into 
the parking area in order to turn around and that this 
would create a situation that was hazardous to public 
safety. Ferriero commented that "to leave the[loading area] 
would require a fairly long backing maneuver across the 
pedestrian access to the site." Similarly, Maltz observed in 
his written report to the Board that "[t]here is no K-turn 
ability for trucks readily available from the loading zone or 
dumpster area, except after backing up about 200 feet 
around a curve and across a painted crosswalk." 
 
Lapid has not pointed to any place in the record where it 
countered these criticisms. And, although Szalay, Lapid's 
civil engineer, agreed at the March 4 hearing that it would 
be a "good suggestion" to create a turn-around area for 
trucks, Lapid did not alter its site plan to account for the 
problems that the Board's experts flagged. 
 
2. Emergency Vehicle Access 
 
The Board also identifies its concerns about inadequate 
access for safety vehicles as an alternative reason why the 
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proposed plan would cause an "undue hardship" for the 
Township by requiring it to compromise the safety of its 
residents. As noted above, there is some dispute about 
whether Fire Chief Ellis ever gave Lapid adequate 
information on the turning radius that was necessary for a 
"tower ladder" fire truck to access an emergency vehicle 
lane that was to swing around the back of the building; (the 
inability to drive a tower ladder truck behind the Facility 
was one of the problems that the Fire Chief identified with 
Lapid's plan). See supra note 1. Even if we discount the 
comments of Fire Chief Ellis, however, several other experts 
testified before the Board about their concerns that 
emergency vehicles would either be unable to access the 
rear of the building or would be unable to back out once 
they got there. Lapid presented almost no counter- 
testimony, and although Lapid's engineer, Szalay, agreed 
that the narrowness of the access road could be a problem, 
Lapid did not amend its site plan to provide a wider access 
way. 
 
In addition to Ellis, Ferriero and Maltz both flagged the 
issue of emergency vehicle access as a problem with the 
site plan in both written reports and public testimony. 
Ferriero's report of March 3, 1999 stated that: 
 
       The plan shows a fire lane extending to the rear of the 
       building. The centerline radius of this drive is 43.5 feet, 
       which is a minimal radius for access. The difficulty 
       with the fire lane as shown is that exiting the fire lane 
       will require backing a vehicle around this same tight 
       radius with the edge of the drive within two feet of the 
       building. If the vehicle is slightly off track to the inside 
       by starting the turn too early, it will strike the building. 
       If the vehicle is too far to the outside by turning too 
       late or too wide, it will run off the access down a 33% 
       slope. 
 
Ferriero's report also pointed out that the emergency 
vehicle access lane would actually be narrowed to around 
seven feet when the sidewalk ramp at the rear of the 
building was fitted with handrails and curbs, as is required 
by the ADA. He concluded that this would be too narrow to 
accommodate any emergency vehicle. 
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Maltz, the traffic engineer, provided similar criticisms of 
the site plan's emergency access way. Maltz echoed 
Ferriero's comments about the narrowness of the lane, and 
the effect of the extension of the handrails into the fire 
access lane. He also wrote that he had done tests with 
models using the turning radius of a standard bus going 
around an access way with the same turning radius and 
dimensions as the one proposed by Lapid. He concluded 
from his tests that it "appears probable" that a fire truck's 
"wheels will leave the grass pavers area and proceed down 
the [adjacent 33%] slope."9 
 
Szalay, Lapid's civil engineer, agreed during the Board's 
March 4 meeting, that in particular, the presence of the 
handrails would present a problem. He also agreed that the 
problem of backing out emergency vehicles from behind the 
building was "a legitimate issue." However, Lapid did not 
revise its site plan to account for these criticisms regarding 
emergency vehicle access before the final hearing with the 
Board on March 24, 1999. It seems likely that the wetlands 
(and the required wetland buffer zone), which were located 
close behind the proposed location for the emergency 
access lane, were the reason that Lapid did not change its 
site plan to provide a wider vehicle access lane. In his 
March 4 testimony, Szalay admitted that the wetlands 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Lapid suggests that the Board's expressed concerns about the 
Township's ability to drive a tower ladder truck behind the Facility (due 
to an insufficient turning radius) were pretextual, arguing that residents 
of two-story nursing homes are unlikely candidates for heroic rescues 
from ladder trucks. We agree that it makes little sense to require a two- 
story building that would house residents who are unable to be carried 
out on a ladder during a fire to provide access for tower ladder trucks. 
However, the Board's concerns about emergency vehicle access focused 
not only on the turning radius of the access lane, but also the width of 
the lane. The Board's experts expressed concern that under Lapid's plan, 
the lane would be as narrow as seven feet at one point. There is evidence 
in the record that this would prevent all of Scotch Plains's fire vehicles 
from accessing the rear of the building (because they are all at least 
eight feet wide). Indeed, as noted above, Lapid's engineer agreed that the 
presence of the handrails would present a problem. Therefore, even 
discounting the issues regarding the turning radius of the emergency 
access lane, the Board still raised serious concerns about emergency 
vehicle access that Lapid acknowledged, but did not address. 
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posed a substantial constraint to widening the access way. 
Nor did Lapid present any evidence that would undermine 
or call into question the Board's experts' opinions on the 
emergency vehicle access route. We agree that with respect 
to its limited safety vehicle access, the site plan would 
impose the "undue hardship" on the Township of 
compromising the safety of its residents. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that it was proper to grant 
summary judgment to the Township on the issue of 
whether it had shown that Lapid's requested 
accommodations with respect to the site plan were 
unreasonable because they would cause an "undue 
hardship" on the Township. The Board presented sufficient 
evidence to grant summary judgment in its favor with 
respect to the site plan approval and non-use variances, 
which were sufficient bases for it to deny the entire 
application. 
 
IV. Was Summary Judgment Proper on the 
       Disparate Impact Claim?  
 
The plaintiffs also appeal the grant of summary judgment 
on their claim that the Township's ordinances have a 
disparate impact on the handicapped in violation of 42 
U.S.C. S 3604(f). Plaintiffs may make out a claim under the 
FHAA using a theory of disparate impact without providing 
proof of discriminatory intent. Doe v. City of Butler, 892 
F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
When reviewing disparate impact claims brought under 
the FHAA, we have borrowed from the framework of Title 
VII disparate impact claims. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. 
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977); see also 
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 
934 (2d Cir. 1988), aff 'd 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam). 
In order to make a prima facie case of disparate impact 
under the FHAA, the plaintiff must show that the 
Township's action had a greater adverse impact on the 
protected group (in this case the elderly handicapped) than 
on others. If the plaintiffs succeed in demonstrating a 
prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to 
show that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 
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the action and that no less discriminatory alternatives were 
available. See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149. 
 
The District Court found that in this case, the plaintiffs 
failed to make a prima facie case of disparate impact. The 
District Court relied on the formulation of the elements of 
a prima facie case for disparate impact under the FHAA 
that the Ninth Circuit set forth in Gamble v. City of 
Escondido, 104 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1997). There, the court 
"identified the following elements of an FHA[A] prima facie 
case under a disparate impact theory: (1) the occurrence of 
certain outwardly neutral practices, and (2) a significantly 
adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a 
particular type produced by the defendant's facially neutral 
acts or practices." Id. at 306 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 
The only evidence that Lapid cites to support its prima 
facie case of disparate impact is that Scotch Plains's zoning 
plan designates only one location in the Township for 
"senior housing."10 This location is part of the Township's 
Broadway Redevelopment Plan, which the plaintiff argues is 
located in an undesirable location, a light industrial area 
rather than a residential area. Lapid also points out that 
the town permits no development of senior residences as of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The District Court allowed the plaintiff to get discovery and rely on 
evidence from outside the administrative record to support its FHAA 
disparate impact claim. We hold that reviewing courts should limit their 
review to the administrative record only on reasonable accommodations 
claims. It was proper for the District Court to allow the plaintiffs to 
rely 
on materials from outside the administrative record to support their 
disparate impact claims. It makes sense that a plaintiff would need 
broader discovery and more latitude on the evidence that he or she is 
allowed to present in a disparate impact claim than in a failure to make 
reasonable accommodations claim. The first involves demonstrating a 
discriminatory pattern resulting from the impact of the municipality's 
decisions, whereas the latter turns only on information regarding the 
necessity and reasonableness of the proposed accommodation, all of 
which can be presented to a local land use board in the first instance. 
Furthermore, this distinction is consistent with the approach of other 
courts that have addressed the proper scope of materials reviewed under 
FHAA reasonable accommodations and disparate impact claims. See, 
e.g., United States v. Village of Palatine , 37 F.3d 1230, 1233 n.3 (7th 
Cir. 
1994). 
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right (that is, the development is not permitted without the 
grant of a use variance), in any other part of the Township 
besides the Broadway Redevelopment Area. 
 
Accepting as true Lapid's arguments on these points, we 
do not believe that they are sufficient to make out a prima 
facie case. They ignore the fact that under New Jersey law, 
developers of group homes for the handicapped (including 
the elderly) may apply for use variances as an "inherently 
beneficial use" in any zone. See Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. 
Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704 A.2d 1271, 
1281 (N.J. 1998) (noting that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has recognized nursing homes as "inherently 
beneficial uses"). Applicants for an "inherently beneficial 
use" under New Jersey law face a reduced standard for 
demonstrating that the use qualifies for a use variance (as 
opposed to applicants for commercial use variances). See 
supra at 16. Therefore, even though Scotch Plains's land 
use regime affirmatively provides for senior housing in only 
one location, that alone does not establish a prima facie 
case of discriminatory impact, especially in light of the fact 
that the Township will entertain use variances for elderly 
housing on a preferential basis in all other locations. 
Furthermore, as the District Court noted, the plaintiff does 
not present any evidence of a pattern of the town refusing 
to grant variances for housing for the elderly or any other 
conduct or statistics that would evince a disparate impact. 
 
We also agree with the District Court that even if we were 
to determine that Lapid had demonstrated a prima facie 
case of disparate impact, it would be appropriate to grant 
summary judgment on the issue that Scotch Plains has 
demonstrated that it had non-discriminatory reasons for 
denying Lapid's site plan application. The test for whether 
the government has articulated a legitimate bona fide 
governmental interest that would support denying the 
application and that no alternative would serve the interest 
with less discriminatory effect, see Rizzo at 148-49, is 
similar to the test of whether the defendant has 
demonstrated that the requested accommodation is 
"unreasonable" for the purposes of rebutting a claim under 
S 3604(f)(3)(B). The Board has pointed to sufficient evidence 
to show that the requested accommodations were 
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unreasonable; the same evidence suffices to show a bona 
fide governmental interest in denying Lapid's site plan 
application. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court. 
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